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One of the features of the years following the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) has been the relatively 
sluggish growth of bank lending, the broader monetary aggregates and nominal incomes, more so 
in the Euro-area and Japan, less so in the USA, with the UK roughly in between.  This has happened 
despite the unprecedented monetary expansions occasioned by their central banks, with official 
short-term interest rates brought down to the zero-lower-bound (ZLB), or beyond (the effective 
lower bound, ELB), and a massive expansion of the central bank balance sheets and the monetary 
base. 
 
There are several potential explanations for this dichotomy between the expansionary intent of 
central bank policy variables and the hesitant growth of broader monetary aggregates.  Amongst 
such possible explanations are that the way in which capital ratio enhancement was introduced, 
especially in Europe (including the UK), which encouraged commercial banks to delever their 
balance sheets; and also that the payment of interest on excessive reserves (IOER) encouraged 
commercial banks to hoard deposits at the central bank, especially in the USA, rather than use such 
additional (excess?) cash balances to add to their loan or securities portfolios, (see Selgin, Floored!, 
2018). 
 
But the proposed explanation on which the rest of this paper will focus is that the policy measures 
of these central banks had (unintended) adverse side-effects of so reducing the net interest 
margins, and hence the profitability of banks, that they were constrained, both by lack of retained 
earnings and capital adequacy and, more directly, by relatively low spreads and margins from 
making loans and expanding their loan books and balance sheets.  Of course, in the short run a cut 
in interest rate will have beneficial effects, e.g. via capital gains on existing securities (notably 
                                                          
1   We thank Carlo Altavilla, Miguel Boucinha, Jose-Luis Peydro and Bill White for their 
comments.  We hope to thrash out such disagreements as remain at a forthcoming joint 
Conference. 
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government debt, the ‘doom loop’, and also depending on accounting procedures), greater 
economic expansion and fewer non-performing loans (NPLs).  But the argument goes that the 
longer short and long rates were kept at rock-bottom levels, the greater would be the likelihood 
that there would be a counter-productive effect on commercial bank profitability, bank lending and 
monetary expansion. 
 
This argument has been made in a number of, primarily theoretical, papers, (Brunnermeier and 
Koby, 2018; Kumhof and Wang, 2018), also see Borio, et al., (2017a and b).  But the question of the 
extent to which, and the timing by which, a persistent low level of (official) short (and long) term 
interest rates might reduce bank profitability, net interest margins (NIMs) and bank lending must 
ultimately remain empirical.2  In a recent paper by Altavilla, Boucinha and Peydro (henceforth ABP), 
‘Monetary Policy and Bank Profitability in a Low Interest Rate Environment’, (initially ECB Working 
Paper, No. 2105, October 2017; then reproduced in Economic Policy, Vol. 96, pp 533-586, October 
2018), the authors claim that the above argument has been exaggerated. 
 
Despite the valid warning, (Economic Policy, p. 561), that it is “particularly challenging to identify 
the effects of monetary policy due to endogeneity and simultaneity issues”, the authors confidently 
claim (Abstract), 
“Our results show that a monetary policy easing – a decrease in short-term interest rates 
and/or a flattening of the yield curve – is not associated with lower bank profits once we 
control for the endogeneity of the policy measures to expected macroeconomic and 
financial conditions.” 
 
                                                          
2  The market seemed to think that, once rates fell close to zero, further cuts were 
detrimental to bank equity values, see Ampudia and Van den Heuvel (2018), who state in 
their Abstract that, 
“with rates close to or below zero, further interest rate cust became detrimental 
for banks’ equity values.  The composition of banks’ balance sheets is important in 
order to understand these effects.  In particular, the change in sensitivity to 
interest rate surprises as rates drop to low and negative levels is much more 
pronounced for banks with a high reliance on deposit funding, compared to other 
banks.  We argue that this pattern can be explained by a reluctance of banks to 
pay negative interest rates on retail deposits.” 
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Again, in the Conclusions, pp 33/34, they report that 
“The results suggest some robust findings.  First, monetary policy easing, summarized as 
either a decrease in short-term interest rates or a flattening of the yield curve, is only 
associated with lower bank profits if there are no appropriate controls for the endogeneity 
of monetary policy to bank financial health – especially during the crisis period – as well as 
to current and expected aggregate economic and financial conditions.” 
 
The authors reach this conclusion by two main routes.  First, they regress the Return on Assets 
(RoA) for a cross-section of European banks on a lagged dependent variable, and two measures of 
policy-related variables, a short-term rate, and the slope of the yield curve.  As shown later here, 
Table 2 below, they find, as might have been expected, positive and significant coefficients on both 
these latter policy-related variables, Col. 1.  Since some bank deposits are non-interest-bearing, 
especially at the ZLB or ELB (on which more later), one might expect bank profits to be a positive 
function of interest rates.  Similarly, since banks do maturity transformation, one might expect bank 
profits to be a positive function of the yield curve, defined as long minus short rates.3 
 
However, the authors then add a variety of other macro -area variables.  As they add some current 
macro variables, Vix, Real GDP growth and inflation (Col. 2), the coefficients on the two policy-
related variables become smaller, but remain positive and significant.  But, when they add three 
expected variables, for the year ahead, for GDP growth, inflation and default frequency, (Col. 4), 
these latter variables become quite highly significant and the two policy-related variables become 
totally insignificant, though in most cases just positive. 
 
The second line of argument that the authors present is to use their (proprietary) ECB data to 
provide 
“evidence from both a panel data model that uses individual bank balance sheet data and 
a dynamic macro model that uses more aggregate data, suggest that following a monetary 
policy shock, the various components of bank profitability react asymmetrically. More 
specifically, since the impact on loan loss provisions largely offsets the one on net interest 
income, the overall effects of monetary policy on bank profitability are muted. Importantly, 
our analysis suggests that keeping interest rates low for long might have negative 
consequences for bank profitability. However, our results suggest that it takes a long period 
of time for monetary policy to exert a substantial adverse effect on bank profitability as a 
                                                          
3   Authors finding such positive relationships are listed in Arce, et al., (2018), p. 3. 
4 
 
result of looser policies, as accommodative monetary conditions support real economic 
activity which, in turn, has a positive impact on bank profitability, thereby offsetting the 
adverse impact.”  (Conclusions, p. 34). 
 
So, the overall conclusion of this paper was that the expansionary monetary policy measures of 
central banks has, as yet, borne no responsibility for reduced commercial bank profitability, and 
hence for slower bank loan and monetary growth (at least via this route).  The sluggish growth of 
bank loans and broad money is just the result of a weak conjuncture.  In so far as central bank 
expansionary policies strengthen the macro-economy, it would by the same token lead to more 
bank lending and monetary growth.  In so far as central banks had been subject to this line of 
criticism, they were to be released from the dock without any stain on their character or 
competence. 
 
We found this analysis challenging, particularly the first main component, for a number of reasons.  
First, our predilection had been to believe that continued exceptionally low and persistent interest 
rates would reduce bank profitability and thereby curtail bank lending significantly.  Second, while 
we tend to accept the general view that the overall strength of the economy is, most likely, more 
important for bank profitability than the accompanying level of nominal interest rates, we would 
have expected the current macro-conjuncture to be more salient than expectations of future real 
growth.  Third, the authors’ finding of the greater impact of the latter is primarily just a statistical 
artefact from their regression equations.  Their sole attempt at explanation is, p. 12/13, that 
“the logic behind this result is that a better expected macroeconomic outlook could 
increase current loan demand by stimulating investment which, in the  area, is largely 
funded via bank intermediation.  On the supply side, banks might be induced to increase 
their lending to the non-financial private sector as the improved economic outlook will 
translate into increased company and household income, and hence lower credit risk.” 
 
We do not find this convincing.  Fixed investment tends to lag a recovery in growth, waiting until 
spare capacity is exhausted.  While credit lines, and additional borrowing limits, may well be 
negotiated in advance, at an early planning stage, such lines of credit will only get drawn at the 
later stage when the investment expenditures are actually made.  So, their proposed explanation 
seems to us to have wrong timing.  As for their supply-side explanation, would a prudent banker 
put more weight on uncertain forecasts than on actual current experience?  Fourth, the 
relationship between official short-term interest rates and the macro-economy was markedly 
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distorted, from end-2008 for several years, by hitting the ZLB (or ELB).  One might have expected 
any study of the relationships between monetary policy variables and broader bank outcomes 
during this period to focus closely on such potential distortions.  Yet, remarkably, there is no 
mention anywhere in the paper of the ZLB (ELB) and its implications. 
 
For all such reasons we were disinclined to take their results at face value.  Since the authors were 
using, in several instances, proprietary ECB data, we could not attempt to replicate their regression 
results exactly.  So what we did, first, was to find as closely equivalent data as we could to replicate 
Columns 1, 2 and 4 in the authors’ Table 2, p. 545, for our available -area data, and for the USA and 
the UK.  Were the authors’ findings specific to the Euro-area, (during this relatively short span of 
time), or did they hold more widely? 
 
Our data set is reported, and compared and contrasted with that of the authors, in Section II.  We 
then describe the results of running similar regressions to those in the authors’ Table 2 on this 
different and expanded data set in Section III.  We agree that bank profitability and their Return on 
Assets has held up better than might have been expected under the circumstances of the GFC and 
the subsequent condition of low short rates and flat yield curves, but our assessment of that in 
Section IV suggests that the steps banks took to protect their profitability then may well also have 
had an adverse effect on bank intermediation, and on the growth of deposits and credit.  Section 
V concludes. 
 
Section II 
Our Data Set 
We gather data on Return on Assets (ROA) for the UK, USA and Euro-area from Bloomberg and 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. The slope of the yield curve is derived from 10 year – 2 year 
Government bond yields from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Stock market volatility (VIX) and 1 
year forecasts of expected default frequency for non-financial firms are from Bloomberg. These 
data use a sample of firms and calculates the mean default frequency for each country. 
Macroeconomic data on actual and 1-year ahead forecasts of, Real GDP growth and Inflation are 
sourced from Global Insight/IHS Markit. All data are at a quarterly frequency. 
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First, we show charts for the ROA4, short rates, and yield curve slope for the USA, Euro-area and 
UK ( Figs. 1-3).  There are several points to note.  First, our data for the USA and the Euro-area are 
quite close to that shown in Figure 1, in ABP, p. 539.  Second, all three regions have a roughly similar 
historical experience for ROA; this is that there was a relatively high but fairly stable level of 
profitability between the beginning of 2000 and 2007, followed by a very sharp decline, and then 
some recovery, but to a much lower level.  In a sense, therefore, there are just three phases in each 
region in this period.  So, although in each region there are thousands of observations, it is equally 
true that it is a very short period, with just three separate phases, which indicates that one does 
need to be cautious about interpreting the econometric results.5  Again, the short rate is normally 
much more variable than the long rate, so there is almost an exact inverse relationship between 
the slope and the short rate, at least until 2008, after which the short rate is held almost constant 
in all three countries, so that the slope trends downwards in line with the declining long rate.  Again, 
short rates tend to decline in each region after the tech bubble in 2000 to a low point in 2001/2 
before rising again up to 2007, fall precipitously in 2008 and then remain nearly constant; so, again, 
there is a commonality among these regions in behaviour, not surprisingly.   
We also show a chart comparing the time paths of ROA, real GDP growth and expected GDP growth 
(Figs. 4-6).  In this case what stands out is that expected growth tends to be a smoothed version of 
actual growth, the latter being considerably more variable than the former.  In the Figures 1-6 
below we show the median ROA for each dataset in the same manner as ABP (2018) do for their 
Euro-area dataset and for the USA. 
It is perhaps worth noting that there are a number of inherent problems in estimating the ROA 
series.  These problems include the fact that we do not treat the data to account for any effects of 
bailouts, which masks the potential downside effects on ROA values and hence the effects of short 
term interest rates. Furthermore, for a minor number of Euro-area banks (<5%), semi-annual data 
on ROA appear for some time periods in the dataset, and are already adjusted to appear as 
quarterly data by the data vendors. Our primary approach when constructing the dataset aims to 
maximize the number of banks used so that the data are as representative as possible. 6   
                                                          
4 We use the median ROA of all banks in the respective datasets as per ABP(2018) 
5  ABP argue that their use of differing methodologies and datasets strengthen their 
conclusions.  But if the problem is that the dataset is short, and not a little peculiar, then 
no econometric robustness can save you. 
6 When we use a restricted dataset with only quarterly data, we obtain qualitatively 
similar results.  
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Another key issue of note is the basis on which banks are included in each of the datasets for the 
USA, Euro-area and UK. In the case of the USA we use only US banks, and hence exclude foreign 
banks, as we aim only to investigate banks affected by the Central Bank rate of the home country. 
Hence in the case of the USA we cannot account for a UK bank operating in the USA. For the Euro-
zone we use only Euro-area banks headquartered in countries in the Euro-area and hence we 
would, for example, exclude a Japanese bank operating in the Euro-area. In the case of the UK we 
are restricted by the data available and use banks operating in the UK, whether they are 
headquartered in the UK or otherwise, and hence the results should be considered in light of the 
manner of construction. 
 
 
 
Fig 1; USA 
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Fig 2 EURO 
 
 
Fig 3 UK  
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Fig 4 USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Fig 5 EURO 
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Fig 6 UK 
 
 
Econometric Methodology 
We estimate the following regression for the Euro-area 
  
	
ROA
i , j ,t
=a
i
+b
1
Level
t
+b
2
Slope
j ,t
+wX
j ,t
+qZ
i , j ,t-1
+e
i , j ,t
  (1) 
where ROA is the return on assets of a bank “	i” operating in a country “	 j ” at time “	t ”; 	
a
i
 are 
bank fixed effects; 
	
b
1
and 
	
b
2
are the coefficients associated with the	Level  of a short-term interest 
rate (the three-month OIS) and the country-specific 	Slope  of the term structure – calculated as 
the difference between the yields on government bonds with a residual maturity of ten years and 
two years.7. The model also includes a set of country-specific8 and one bank-specific control, 
	
X
j
, 
and 
	
Z
i , j ,t-1
, respectively. Country specific controls include current and expected GDP growth, 
expected inflation, a measure of stock market volatility (VIX), and a forward looking measure of 
borrower risk (the expected default frequency, ‘Default Average’). The bank-specific control is the 
                                                          
7 Positive values for these two coefficients would imply that an increase in interest rates 
or a steepening of the term structure tends to lead to an increase in bank profitability 
8 We include VIX in this term although it is same for all countries 
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lagged dependent variable. The vectors of coefficients w and q  indicate the response of bank 
profitability to the controls used in the regression.  
For the Euro-area area we use bank level and macro economic data from the following countries; 
Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal.  Due to data 
availability we use forecast data from Q42003- Q42016 from IHS markit.  We exclude 
Luxembourg, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia due to data 
availability, where sufficient data on macro economic expectations were not available. We collect 
data for 116 Euro-area Banks. These data are sourced from Bloomberg as those banks classified 
as European banks for the countries listed above. These banks are all headquartered in the 
countries detailed above. 
 
For the USA dataset we adapt the model in Eqn.(1) so that we only test US banks with US 
Macroeconomic Data. We take all banks listed on Bloomberg as ‘US banks’ and add USA 
headquartered ‘Global Banks’, which do not feature in the original commercial bank listing from 
Bloomberg. In total we gather data for 331 US banks and do not include any foreign banks that are 
active in the USA, in the dataset.   
For the UK, we use data from 13 banks operating in the UK for which quarterly data are available; 
these include non-UK headquartered Banks. We also use only UK Macroeconomic data even though 
some banks are non-UK headquartered. 
 
Our tests for the UK and USA can be summarized in the following regression (2) where all values 
for Macroeconomic variables are restricted to a single country, the USA or UK respectively.  
  
	
ROA
i ,t
=a
i
+b
1
Level
t
+b
2
Slope
t
+wX
t
+qZ
i ,t-1
+e
i ,t
    (2) 
 
Summary statistics for the USA and Euro-area are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Summary stats for USA 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 22,473 0.0020 0.0058 -0.6541 0.0611 
SHORT RATE (OIS) 22,508 1.3794 1.7065 -0.3610 5.3925 
SLOPE 22,508 1.4596 0.8942 -0.3800 2.8000 
VIX 22,508 20.1312 8.2511 11.6200 55.2800 
REAL GDP GROWTH  22,508 2.0155 1.7038 -3.9244 5.2977 
INFLATION  22,508 2.1832 1.3545 -1.4268 5.0218 
EXPECTED GDP GROWTH  17,543 2.640 0.659 0.800 4.400 
EXPECTED INFLATION 17,543 1.6943 0.3779 1.1000 2.9000 
DEFAULT AV 22,508 0.0028 0.0026 0.0004 0.0146 
 
Summary stats for EURO Area 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 5,832 0.0012 0.0134 -0.4976 0.1209 
SHORT RATE (OIS) 8,500 1.8456 1.6486 -0.3610 4.8700 
SLOPE 7,998 1.3810 1.2067 -6.8919 18.4217 
VIX 8,500 20.1312 8.2514 11.6200 55.2800 
REAL GDP GROWTH 8,500 1.1378 2.8348 -10.7863 29.2577 
INFLATION 8,500 1.8719 1.3040 -2.8942 5.7607 
EXPECTED GDP GROWTH 6,621 1.2907 1.2290 -10.4000 6.5000 
EXPECTED INFLATION  6,641 1.7114 0.5876 -1.4000 4.7000 
DEFAULT AV 8,500 0.0050 0.0081 0.0000 0.0418 
 
 
 
 
When we estimate the models in Eqns. (1) and (2) we regressions that matches Table 2 in ABP 
(2018). We begin with independent variables corresponding to their column 1 regression, then 
col 2, and finally column 4. 
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Section III 
 
In Table 2 we set out a comparison of the authors’ Columns 1, 2 and 4 from their Table 2, p. 13, 
with our results, trying to find closely equivalent data from the USA, UK and the Euro-area area.  By 
far the best and most comprehensive data that we could find came from the USA.  Whereas ABP 
have 6768 data points from 288 Euro banks, we have 22,473 data points from 331 US banks.  As 
noted above, our least good data are from the UK, so we put these in the final comparative column.  
The EURO data come in between. 
 
As will be immediately seen from Table 2, our results are very mixed.  The most supportive, of the 
ABP results are those in our data set from the USA.  In this case, as in ABP, the coefficient on the 
short rate is positive and significant in the comparison to their Column 1, where SR and Slope are 
the only explanatory variables, but turns negative, and just significant, in the comparison with 
Column 4.  Again, similar to ABP, the expected growth of GDP is positive and significant, and much 
more so than the actual growth of GDP, in a comparison of Columns 2 and 4.  But even here there 
are some obvious differences.  In our US data the slope coefficient is negative and significant 
throughout; note that in Figure 1 US slope rises 2007-2009, while RoA collapses, and then trends 
down, as RoA recovers.  Beyond that, the coefficient on expected default has the opposite sign 
(while being significant) in these two data sets. 
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Table 2: COL 1,2 and 4 (grey shaded) report the results from the corresponding columns in Table 2 of Alatavilla, Bucharina and Peydro (2018). USA, UK 
and EURO area represent our replications of these regressions from our regression eqn (2) for USA and (1) for EURO area and UK (see text). Errors are 
robust and clustered at bank level for USA and EURO area. For the UK we use cross section weights and Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) (weighted). 
 
 
 
 
 
COL	1 USA EURO UK COL	2 USA EURO UK COL	4 USA EURO UK
ROA(-1)	 0.556*** 0.2581*** 0.450216*** 0.05877 0.539*** 0.25007*** 0.4397851*** 0.05661 0.505*** 0.379801*** 0.4310912*** 0.04763
[0.0363] [0.00957] [0.0394846] [0.141295] [0.0364] [0.0088] [0.0439815] [0.140879] [0.041] [0.0073] [0.0457211] [0.142128]
SR 0.0349*** 0.00005*** 0.003019* 0.000601*** 0.0195*** 0.0000556*** 0.0005216** 0.000694*** -0.00340 -0.0000178** 0.0006773** 0.001266***
[0.00713] [0.00002] [0.0001611] [0.000229] [0.00745] [0.0000189] [0.0002066] [0.000244] [0.0085] [0.00000746] [0.000286] [0.000048]
SLOPE 0.00382*** -0.0006*** 0.00057 0.00044 0.00313** -0.0000155* 0.00071 0.00064 0.00040 -0.00016*** 0.00092 0.001779***
[0.00128] [0.00004] [0.0004569] [0.000455] [0.00132] [0.0000348] [0.0004927] [0.000503] [0.00137] [0.0000156] [0.0005988] [0.000682]
VIX -	0.00325*** 0.000000525 -0.0000284 -0.0000559 0.00213* -0.00000601*** -0.0000202 -0.0000747
[0.000785] [0.00000355] [0.0000172] [0.0000404] [0.00113] [0.000001] [0.0000203] [0.0000577]
REAL	GDPg	 0.0154*** 0.000105*** 0.0002439** -0.00020 -0.00571 0.0000611*** 0.0001285** 0.000069
[0.00484] [0.0000185] [0.0000959] [0.000195] [0.00464] [0.00000665] [0.0000637] [0.00039]
INFLATION 0.0394** -0.00001 -0.0005954** -0.00024 0.0327* 0.00000958* 0.0007183** -0.00048
[0.0162] [0.0000214] [0.000279] [0.000219] [0.0178] [0.00000579] [0.0002983] [0.000336]
EXPECTED	GDPg 0.0828*** 0.000162*** 0.0005133* -0.00075
[0.0109] [0.0000152] [0.0002841] [0.000584]
EXPECTED	INF 0.0687** -0.0000608*** -0.0002614 -0.00049
[0.0348] [0.0000194] [0.0004912] [0.001054]
DEFAULT -	0.0593*** 0.0000162*** -0.1469924*** 0.00093
[0.0202] [0.0000031] [0.056411] [0.002154]
OBS 6768 22142 5422 491 6768 22142 5422 491 6768 17508 4293 446
R2 0.69 0.31 0.23 0.57 0.7 0.3 0.24 0.59 0.70 0.16 0.25 0.6
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Perhaps the most contrary results are those for the UK, where the only significant, and positive, 
coefficients throughout, are those for the short rate and slope.  While we tend to discount these 
results because of the relatively small number of banks, and hence of observations, it is somewhat 
more in line with the traditional view. 
 
In the case of the Euro-area, our results are not greatly out of line, with one important exception.  
This is that with our Euro-area bank data, the coefficient on the short rate remains positive and 
significant throughout.  Minor exceptions are that the inclusion of expected GDP growth does not 
completely remove the significance of actual growth, and that the coefficient on expected default 
has the opposite sign and significance. 
 
Possibly the main lesson is that one should not rush to make any conclusions from an econometric 
exercise over a short data period, with three clear phases for the dependent variable, and massive 
problems of endogeneity and simultaneity, irrespective of the apparent number of observations 
and degrees of freedom.  In particular we feel that the claim of ABP, that they have a ‘robust finding’ 
that ‘a monetary policy easing…. is not associated with lower bank profit once we control for the 
endogeneity of the policy measures to expected macroeconomic and financial conditions’ cannot 
be safely generalized beyond their own data set. 
 
We wondered also how far the results were driven by the dramatic and extreme results of the 
short-lived GFC.  We tested this by comparing our Column 4 results for the USA, Euro-area and UK 
(columns headed in grey in Table 3), with the results for running with dummy variables taking the 
value 1 for 2008 Q4 to 2009 Q3 (headed GFC), or excluding those observations altogether (headed 
no GFC).  Somewhat to our surprise, excluding the GFC period made relatively little difference to 
the overall picture.  This can also be regarded as a robustness test. 
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Table 3:  The area shaded in grey shows Col 4 from Table 2 in Altavilla Bucharina and Peydro (2018). The other columns show the results for our replication 
of Col. 4, as highlighted in section II above for the USA, EURO Area and UK. The GFC column refers to our addition of the dummy variable from q2,2007 
to q4,2008 =1 and =0 otherwise. The column ‘No GFC’ shows the regressions with all data from q2, 2007 to q4, 2008 dropped from the regressions.  
 
 
 
 
 
COL	4 USA GFC No	GFC EURO GFC No	GFC UK GFC No	GFC
ROA(-1)	 0.505*** 0.379801*** 0.2343391*** 0.238995*** 0.4310912*** 0.429956*** 0.2642197*** 0.047625 0.047607 0.024585
[0.041] [0.0073] [0.0245499] [0.0186043] [0.0457211] [0.0443768] [0.0731381] [0.142128] [0.142308] [0.150663]
SR -0.00340 -0.0000178** -0.0000944*** -0.0005849*** 0.0006773** 0.0009142*** 0.0009394*** 0.001266*** 0.001267*** 0.001583***
[0.0085] [0.00000746] [0.0000318] [0.0000808] [0.000286] [0.0003522] [0.000233] [0.000048] [0.000387] [0.000489]
SLOPE 0.00040 -0.00016*** -0.0004774*** -0.0001921*** 0.0009151 0.0009142 0.0010593* 0.001779*** 0.001783** 0.002352***
[0.00137] [0.0000156] [0.000069] [0.0000369] [0.0005988] [0.0005998] [0.0005927] [0.000682] [0.000695] [0.000835]
VIX 0.00213* -0.00000601*** -0.0000291*** 0.0001113*** -0.0000202 -0.0000017 0.0000322 -0.0000747 -0.000075 -0.0000994
[0.00113] [0.000001] [0.00000687] [0.0000282] [0.0000203] [0.000014] [0.0000225] [0.0000577] [0.0000582] [0.00007]
REAL	GDPg	 -0.00571 0.0000611*** 0.0001068*** 0.0000819*** 0.0001285** 0.0001306** 0.0002895*** 0.000069 0.0000626 0.0000946
[0.00464] [0.00000665] [0.0000275] [0.0000281] [0.0000637] [0.0000626] [0.0000878] [0.00039] [0.000432] [0.000471]
INFLATION 0.0327* 0.00000958* 0.000013 0.0003843*** 0.0007183** -0.0006569** -0.0007845*** -0.000475 -0.000477 -0.000551
[0.0178] [0.00000579] [0.000022] [0.0000519] [0.0002983] [0.000276] [0.0002846] [0.000336] [0.000342] [0.00041]
EXPECTED	GDPg 0.0828*** 0.000162*** 0.0004047*** -0.0000989*** 0.0005133* 0.0005246* 0.0004944* -0.000753 -0.000751 -0.000956
[0.0109] [0.0000152] [0.0000538] [0.000057] [0.0002841] [0.0002795] [0.0002613] [0.000584] [0.000585] [0.000663]
EXPECTED	INF 0.0687** -0.0000608*** -0.0001488*** -0.0000374** -0.0002614 -0.0003258 -0.0003853 -0.000493 -0.000495 -0.001047
[0.0348] [0.0000194] [0.0000527] [0.00000617] [0.0004912] [0.0004616] [0.0005049] [0.001054] [0.001056] [0.001185]
DEFAULT -	0.0593*** 0.0000162*** 0.0616416*** 0.1142277*** -0.1469924*** -0.1464914** -0.1289641*** 0.000932 0.00089 0.000177
[0.0202] [0.0000031] [0.0181222] [0.0196714] [0.056411] [0.0573778] [0.060955] [0.002154] [0.002513] [0.003151]
GFC -0.00018 -0.0019609 0.0000542
[0.0001216] [0.0017356] [0.001686]
OBS 6768 17508 17508 15522 4293 4293 3718 446 446 410
R2 0.70 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.25 0.247 0.226 0.6 0.12 0.13
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Another aspect of the results where our attempt at reworking the econometric exercise of ABP left 
their results unscathed, again slightly to our surprise, was that, at least for the USA and Euro-area, 
expected growth dominated actual real growth as a determinant of RoA, i.e. a measure of bank 
profitability.  As earlier noted, we do not find their explanation of this convincing.  We might 
advance two, associated, alternative suggestions.  First, both the profits set out in bank accounts 
and expectations of future real growth are somewhat smoothed measures of the underlying erratic 
current developments.  There are natural reasons for both series to get smoothed similarly in 
response to such erratic outcomes.  Second, no one at the time has a clear vision of the current 
conjuncture.  Perhaps expectations of growth are a better indicator of banks’ perceptions of 
current conditions than subsequent revised data on actual growth.9 
 
A final aspect of their results, more widely supported in the literature, is that bank profitability, and 
RoA, held up rather better in post-GFC conditions, e.g. of sluggish growth, low inflation, effective 
lower bound to short rates and flattening slope, than might have been expected.  How did this 
happen?  We discuss this in the next Section. 
 
III. Components of Bank Profitability 
 
The main sources of bank profitability can be divided into three components, see ABP, Section 3.2, 
pp 548-550.  These are Net Interest Income (NII), which is in turn related to the Net Interest Margin 
times the stock of interest-bearing assets; Non-Interest Income (NNI), from fees and other sources 
of NNI, such as capital gains and commissions; and Provisions, which in turn relate to the likelihood 
of loans becoming non-performing (NPLs).  We shall examine each in turn. 
                                                          
9   Liberini, et al., (2019), suggests that 
“UK citizens’ feelings about their incomes were a substantially better predictor of pro-
Brexit views than their actual incomes.  This seems an important message for economists, 
because the subject of economics has typically avoided the study of human feelings in 
favour of ‘objective’ data.” 
Nyman et al. (2018) illustrate that human emotions - measured as the balance between 
anxiety and excitement derived from economic news narratives, when orthogonalized to 
the real economy, are linked to the changes in the FTSE stock market index, Employment 
and Industrial production in the UK.  
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(a) Net Interest Income (NII) and Margins (NIM) 
Under normal circumstances, the spread that banks maintain between deposit (and other 
borrowing) rates and lending rates can be relatively unaffected by changes in official short rates, 
with both deposit and loan rates moving in line with official rates, leading possibly to an almost one 
for one pass through (after a short lag), see, among others, Saunders (2019), ‘Pass-through of Bank 
rate to household interest rates’.10  Instead, the spread is mainly determined by banks’ ‘wholesale 
funding costs, their operational costs, competitive pressures, and the relative supply of deposits 
and demand for credit’, Saunders, op cit, p. 3, who then references a sizeable literature on the 
determinants of NIM, (ibid, footnote 6). 
 
But retail depositors are strongly averse to being charged for holding (sight or time) deposits with 
banks, and have the option of holding zero-yielding cash/currency instead.  So banks have been 
unwilling to lower deposit rates below zero.  Saunders (ibid, pages 3/4), notes that  
‘in 2000-07, household sight deposit rates on average were about 220bp below Bank Rate, 
with a range of 150bp to 330bp.  The picture is much the same over a longer period.  Time 
deposit rates usually exceed sight deposit rates, reflecting an illiquidity premium and at 
times an upward sloping yield curve, and on average were 40bp below Bank Rate during 
2000-07.  With similar trends in PNFCs interest rates, the overall weighted average interest 
rate on household and PNFC deposits during 2000-07 was roughly 135bp below the policy 
rate.  The picture was broadly similar in the euro area as a whole, with some variation 
between countries.’  
The implication is clear; once official rates start to fall below 1.5%, the margin between the official 
short rates and deposit rates becomes progressively squeezed.  In order to maintain NIM and 
profitability, banks have also to break the link between lending rates and official rates, so bank 
lending rates do not go down alongside official rates once the latter fall below much about 1.5%. 
 
But conditions when official rates are falling towards the effective lower bound (ELB) are generally 
extremely adverse for banks, low (or negative) growth, rising NPLs and provisions, low demand for 
credit, etc.  In such circumstances banks’ over-riding priority is self-preservation and the 
                                                          
10   Though see Drechsler, et al., (2017), who document that in the USA the spread 
between deposit rates and official short rates widens as short rates rise, triggering 
deposit outflows, and hence, they argue, to reductions in bank lending. 
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maintenance of profitability.  In this context the response of banks to falling official rates has often 
been to raise spreads,11 and NIM, by raising lending rates just as the official interest rate falls 
towards the ELB.12  As Eggertsson, et al. (2019), in their study on Sweden report (p. 16), 
“Once the deposit rate becomes bounded however, this relationship flips.  A one 
percentage point reduction in the repo rate, now increases bank lending rates by 0.03 to 
0.31 percentage points.  This reversal in sign holds across all loan contracts.” 
 
Also see Heider, Saidi and Schepens (2019).  For a study giving a contrary result, see Arce, et al., 
(2018), especially Section 6.1.  Figure 7 from Saunders, op cit, p. 7, provides a nice example.   
 
 
 
Note: In this chart, wholesale spreads are an average of Opco and Holdco measures, relative to Libor. 
Mortgage spreads are measured by a weighted average of various mortgage rates against an 
appropriate mix of Bank Rate and swap rates. 
Source: Bank of England. 
 
                                                          
11  In Switzerland Credit Suisse raised mortgage rates the day after the Swiss National 
Bank introduced the negative rate on bank reserves.  We thank Bill White for reminding 
us of this. 
12  In the eurozone, this was countered by the ECB directly offering credit at the negative 
policy rate, via TLTROs. 
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The NIM, or spread, is a measure of the cost of intermediation.  So, as official rates fall below 1.5%, 
that cost may rise, the more so as official rates turn negative.  If the cost of intermediation rises, so 
the volume of intermediation will decline, and the growth rate both of deposits and loans will slow, 
or even fall.  Thus, the attempts of banks to maintain profitability and RoA will, via this route, lead 
to a reduction in bank intermediation, slower deposit growth and domestic credit expansion. 
 
Moreover, as recorded by Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2019), pp 4-5, 
“a set of recent empirical papers has shown that low interest rates, especially for an 
extended period of time, are significant factors in the build-up of risks in the banking 
system.  For example, Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) find that low short-term interest rates 
soften standards for household and corporate loans, Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marques-
Ibanez (2014) document that “too low for too long” short-term interest rates lead to 
increase in risk-taking by banks, Jiménez et al. (2014) show that lower short-term rates 
induce lowly capitalized banks to grant more loan applications to ex-ante riskier firms, 
while Dell-Ariccia, Laeven and Suarez (2017) show that short-term interest rates are 
negatively associated to ex-ante risk-taking by banks, via changes in leverage.  Our paper 
provides a theoretical framework that can account for these empirical results.” 
 
Thus measured ROA would stay up, but would fall on a risk-adjusted basis.  Also see Xu, Hu and Das 
(2019); and Acosta-Smith (2018).  But the results overall are quite mixed, see Avalos and 
Mamatzikis (2018, especially Section 4, and Urbschat (2018, pp 5 and 28). 
 
(b) Non-Interest Income 
ABP find ‘no significant relationship is found with the level or slope of interest rates’, p. 550.  A fall 
in interest rates would raise profitability and RoA via capital gains if these were taken into the P 
and L account.  They are somewhat dismissive of the scale of this effect; thus they write (ibid, p. 
550) that capital gains  
‘should in principle benefit from a decline in interest rates, as lower yields are reflected in 
higher asset prices.  It is however, important to note that while changes in the valuation of 
securities held by banks affect their economic value, they are reflected in the profit and 
loss account only if the securities are accounted at market values or if the capital gain/loss 
is realized.  Since the share of securities held at market values is relatively small…. it is not 
surprising that the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant.’ 
 
Similarly, Urbschat (op. cit, 2018 p. 6) states, 
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“the bad news is that banks neither benefit from increased fee income (as fees are not 
proportional to deposits) nor from capital gains following high asset prices, which is among 
others due to the conservative German accounting law.” 
 
Some of the maintenance, or increase, in banks’ NII will represent a shift in their pattern of business 
from (high capital requirement) activities such as credit extension and market-making to (low 
capital requirement) business such as wealth management.  However, some significant proportion, 
(though we know of no estimates of that), will have come from raising fees and commission charges 
on the same business as before.  Arce, et al., (2018, pp 15 and 16) concur with this hypothesis.  
Thus, they state, 
“This suggests that banks tried to offset the reduction in net interest income by increasing 
commission and fees.”13 
“Additionally, it supports the hypothesis that low-capital banks tried to offset the reduction 
in net interest income, which can be used to build capital organically, by increasing 
commission and fees.” 
As in the case of raising NIMs, this may help to protect bank profitability, but at the expense of the 
volume/scale of bank intermediation.   
 
(c) Provision and NPLs 
Provisions are, of course, inversely related to the macro-economic conjuncture, and in so far as 
expansionary monetary policy improves activity and growth, it will lower provisions and NPLs.  
Once again, ABP find that expected growth is much more significant than actual growth, (Table 3, 
p. 549, column 3).  Also, they find the regulatory capital ratio (negative) and the slope of the yield 
curve (positive) to be significant, but given the trends in these variables over this short data period 
any interpretation should be cautious. 
 
The relationship between official short rates on the one hand, and provisions and NPLs on the 
other, is more complex.  As ABP emphasize, in so far as lower rates enhance demand and activity, 
they will reduce provisions and NPLs.  Against that, however, lower rates make the cost of carrying, 
rather than closing out, NPLs less, and also encourage further on-lending to weak companies to 
prevent them even becoming non-performing (a process known as ever-greening).  Meanwhile a 
high stock of NPLs may be another (minor) factor causing banks to raise margins to protect 
                                                          
13  Banks may react to the effective zero lower bound on retail deposit interest rates by 
raising fees instead. 
22 
 
themselves, see Bredl (2018).  So the effect of lower official rates both on provisions, NPLs and the 
volume of lending is probably ambiguous, but the effect on the quality of the loan book is most 
likely counter-productive.  A larger proportion of the loan book will get directed to low quality 
borrowers. 
 
(d) Summary 
Once rates fall to exceptionally low levels, banks are forced to take countervailing measures to 
protect their profitability.  These measures, raising spreads and fees, will raise the cost of 
intermediation, and via ever-greening and other steps to lower write-offs, will lower the allocative 
quality of the loan book.  The efforts of the banks in such conditions to maintain profitability will 
have corresponding costs in holding down both the quantity and quality of bank domestic credit.14 
 
Saunders (op cit., pp 11-12), notes that, 
“BoE models suggest that monetary policy in the UK operates through four main 
channels: the exchange rate; cost of capital and non-housing wealth; the cashflow effect 
on households and their willingness to bring forward or delay purchases; and a housing 
channel. The latter two channels rely on the pass-through of policy rate changes to 
household interest rates…. The Bank's suite of models suggest that these two [latter] 
channels typically account for between a third and two thirds of the total expected 
medium-term impact on output from policy rate changes, depending on how persistent 
the interest rate change is and the extent to which it is anticipated…. It is not possible to 
be precise about where the threshold for such a zone of reduced policy effectiveness 
might be. It probably starts when sight deposit rates reach or are close to their effective 
lower bound, and hence when the policy rate itself is clearly above the ELB. As a rough 
estimate, my guess is it that for the UK this might occur at a policy rate of roughly 2% or 
so, reflecting a near-zero floor for sight deposit rates plus an equilibrium spread of 150-
                                                          
14   This argument has much in common with that of Gorton, Laarits and Muir (2019).  
They argue that, 
“this exemplifies a common feature of modern crises where a central bank is 
present.  Banks reduce loans prior to the crisis while depositors stand pat to see 
what the central bank does, even if they already recognize crisis conditions.  The 
true start of the crisis, then, can be before any obvious indications of stress, such 
as bank failures. Indeed, Boyd et al., (2009) examine the dating of crisis in four 
crisis databases and find that large reductions in loan growth predict crisis start 
dates.” 
In so far as exceptionally low rates, flat yield curves, and capital regulation exacerbated 
the tendency for banks to maintain profitability, for self-preservation, it will have placed 
yet further downwards pressure on the growth of deposits and bank credit. 
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200bp between household sight deposit rates and the policy rate. The reduction in policy 
effectiveness may become more marked as the policy rate approaches the ELB and a 
higher share of deposit rates (eg time deposits) become constrained.” 
However, he implicitly assures that the effect on demand is positive, even if muted.  But what if the 
effect is negative?15  Especially in circumstances when the exchange rate channel is muted, for one 
reason or another, then the net effect on demand of lowering interest rates could become 
negative, in part because of a rising cost of bank intermediation, (see for example Brunnermaier 
and Koby, 2018; Kumhof and Wang, 2018). 
 
Because he assumes that the net effect of lowering interest rates beyond the point that causes 
banks to have problems in maintaining profitability remains always positive, Saunders argues that 
policy would just need to be more aggressive in order to hit its target, 
“I stress that if the monetary transmission mechanism is less effective at a low rate level – 
and this is still an ‘if’ – this will not prevent the MPC from achieving the inflation target over 
time.  The MPC could allow for this issue by adjusting monetary policy slightly more actively 
(when the policy rate is low) in order to produce a desired impact on the economy.” 
But not only does the effective lower bound (ELB) ultimately place a firm limit on such aggression, 
but also if the net effect is, or becomes over time, negative, such extra aggression would be 
counter-productive. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
There has appeared to be a contradiction between the arguments of two sets of economists.  The 
first set, usually populated by Central Bank economists, deny that expansionary monetary policy 
has had a seriously adverse effect (yet) on bank profitability, and, though more by implication than 
directly, on the impact of such policies on the economy via the banking system.  This set has been 
represented here by ABP (2018). 
 
                                                          
15  See White (2012), ‘Ultra Easy Monetary Policy and the Law of Unintended 
Consequences’. 
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The second set, usually represented by academic economists, argues instead that the effect of 
extraordinarily low interest rates on the banking channels is, or can become, negative and 
sufficiently so to have a net negative effect on the economy as a whole.  Thus, Eggertsson, et al., 
(2019), argue in their Abstract that, 
“Once the policy rate turns negative, the usual transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
through the bank sector breaks down.  Moreover, because a negative policy rate reduces 
bank profits, the total effect on aggregate output can be contractionary.  A calibration 
which matches Swedish bank level data suggests that a policy rate of -0.50 percent 
increases borrowing rates by 15 basis points and reduces output by 7 basis points.” 
 
An aim of our paper has been to try to reconcile these two positions.  The two key points of the 
ABP paper, were that (1) once macro-conjunctural, forward-looking variables were included in the 
regressions, then the (positive) effect of the policy variables (short rate and yield slope) on bank 
profitability disappeared, and (2) that such policies had only an ambiguous and small effect on bank 
profitability.  We have shown that the first conclusion does not generalize to a wider set of data, 
and anyhow is suspect given the short time period and inherent simultaneities involved.  While we 
accept that bank profitability has held up better than might have been expected, we claim that this 
is because banks, to protect themselves, have both raised the cost of intermediation and allowed 
the quality of their loan portfolio to fall, thereby reducing the beneficial effect of domestic credit 
expansion.  We should, however, note that this latter claim is strongly contested by ABP who state 
that, according to their data, neither did the cost of intermediation rise nor did the quality of the 
loan portfolio fall.  We, and ABP, hope to arrange a conference later this year to sort out this and 
other connected issues. 
 
Banks, and the bank lending channel, are left out of too many models.  In such cases the benefits 
of lowering interest rates to, and beyond, the zero lower bound are much exaggerated, and the net 
effect of such measures could even have been net contractionary. 
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